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Abstract
A classic argument in economics is that experience in the market
place will eliminate mistakes and cognitive biases. Internet auctions
are a popular market were some bidders gather extensive experience.
In a unique data set from a Scandinavian auction site I question if
and what bidders learn. At face value experienced bidders do adapt
better bidding strategies. However, the so-called pseudo-endowment
effect does not disappear. Regardless of their experience, bidders will
be inclined to increase their willingness to pay as a response to having
had “ownership” (the leading bid) before being outbid. Thus, this data
can confirm that feedback, and especially negative feedback, seems to
be a critical component in learning.
Keywords: Experience, Learning, Internet auctions, Reference-Dependent
Preferences, Endowment Effect, Bidding behavior, eBay.
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1 Introduction
A long standing debate between Neoclassical and Behavioral Economists
is whether experience eliminates cognitive biases in decision making. The
neoclassical argument is that irrationality will be exploited in the market.
Thus, participants need to become rational if they are to continue trading.
Underlying this learning argument is basically three conditions. First of all,
past experiences need to be both relevant and applicable for the specific
decision problem. Most people would have extensive experience in buying
clothes, but only little experience in buying a house. Generally, we would
therefore expect participants to learn more about buying clothes than buying
houses.
Second, learning by your mistakes requires that you realize these mistakes.
For instance, some buyers of 4x4 SUVs might actually be better off with a
more economical MPV, but if they do not realize that, they will continue
to buy SUVs. Generally the outcome must provide positive or negative
feedback about the decision, and the decision maker will need to reflect and
be able to act upon this feedback.
Finally, if rationality is taught by the market, the market must be character-
ized by rational behavior. If stock markets, for instance, are characterized
by irrational exuberance, it may not be optimal to base decision on ratio-
nal models (at least in the short run), and it may certainly be difficult to
learn to be rational. Behavior taught by the market is therefore not always
rational as such.
Internet auctions have made auctions available for everyone. In this market
we find both the amateurs who are bidding for the first time, the bidders
with extensive experience and the professionals who are buying with the
purpose of re-sale. In this standardized environment there is no doubt that
experiences from one auction are relevant to other auctions. Internet auc-
tions are therefore a market setting where we can zoom in on the second
and third condition and test if and what bidders learn.
This is not the first study to consider the effect of experience in internet auc-
tions. In the early paper by Wilcox (2000) experience is found to change the
bidding behavior and make late bidding more pronounced. As this observa-
tion is found in eBay data, where this could be the dominating strategy1, he
concludes that bidders learn to be more rational. Similar observations have
1Due to e.g. hard endings and common value. For an overview on this, see Bajari and
Hortacsu (2004)
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been performed by e.g. Ockenfels and Roth (2002) and Borle et al. (2006).
Although these observations surely reveal that experience does play a role,
the unique data behind the present study allows me to explore this deeper.
Lauritz.com is a Scandinavian auction site with a proxy bidding system
much like eBay’s. Yet, there are important differences in the setup such
that late bidding is no longer the strategically dominating strategy. In fact,
the analysis in Bramsen (2008a) concludes that an early bid is the optimal
strategy. From that point of view this article can confirm that experience
does improve bidding by making bidders bid earlier and fewer times.
That experienced bidders are able to change their bidding towards more
optimal strategies is not necessarily the same as saying that they are able
to decrease their cognitive biases and become rational. In fact this article
presents evidence that this is not the case.
When bidders at some point start expecting to win, the prospect of losing
can make bidders increase their willingness to pay. This pseudo-endowment
effect is found in both the laboratory by Ariely et al. (2004) and empirically
from inexperienced bidders by Bramsen (2008b). This article continues down
this path and demonstrates that even with extensive experience, the average
bidder will still be affected by having had the leading bid.
Generally, this article demonstrates that if the feedback is teaching us to
become more rational, we can learn. But if feedback is either missing, weak
or delayed, mistakes and biases can be difficult to eliminate.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the auction and the
data used. Section 3 explores the development in bidding as bidders get
more experienced and section 4 is concerned with the pseudo-endowment
effect. Section 5 draws parallels to the literature and concludes.
2 The data
Lauritz.com is an auction house based primarily in Denmark, but with ac-
tivities in Germany, Norway and Sweden. All their auctions are internet
auctions much like eBay.com, but there are some important differences. Lau-
ritz.com is not only an internet site, but also a physical auction house with
18 locations (2008) where the goods are located and available for inspection
during business hours. Potential bidders therefore have the opportunity to
examine the goods thoroughly before bidding. Lauritz.com was a traditional
auction house before 2000 and has kept the tradition of making an expert
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estimate of the value of the items. Most, if not all, the necessary information
for evaluating the item’s common and private value is therefore accessible
from the start.
The particular data I have access to are from all the modern furniture auc-
tions in 2005, which amount to about 37,000 auctions2. More specifically,
I have access to the complete bidding histories, i.e. exact time of bids, the
bidders’ ID numbers etc., much like the available information on any eBay
auction just after expiry3. From these histories I can backtrack the bid-
ders’ actual bids (both incremental- and max-bids), and when they were
submitted.
Furniture is one of the traditional goods for auction houses, and especially
Lauritz.com has branded itself as reselling classic Scandinavian furniture
designs. Although it is classic designs, the vast majority of the furniture for
sale is different and normally there are no competing auctions with similar
furniture at the same time.
While Laurtiz.com was well established on the Danish market in 2005, this
was a period of expansion in Germany and Sweden. I have therefore limited
my analysis to the 27,000 Danish auctions. Since this is an analysis of
bidding behavior, I have limited the data to auctions with at least two
bidders4. Excluding some extreme auctions brings the number of auctions
down to 16,8645.
The typical auction procedure is that the seller brings the item to the nearest
auction house where an expert makes a valuation. If the seller is interested
in selling, Lauritz.com puts it on the internet site with auction expiration
exactly one week later6. By policy none of the auctions have a reserve price,
but the first available bid is $50 (2005) since this will cover the minimum fee
2Modern furniture consists of two categories: 1) miscellaneous (29%) and 2) tables and
chairs (71%).
3The data used for this article is therefore in principle publicly available. I did, however,
receive the data directly from Lauritz.com with a few extras which are not used here.
4Excluding auctions with only one bidder will bias the observed bidding bidding behav-
ior. However, the behavior in auctions with one bidder seems less interesting and may also
be adversely biased for this purpose. I have therefore chosen not to include these. This
will also allow a more direct comparison to second part of the analysis, since competition
is needed to activate the pseudo-endowment effect.
5Only auctions with a valuation between $200 and $6,000 are included. Also, there are
a few auctions with an error in the time of start that subsequently have been altered by
mistake and have therefore been removed. The remaining auctions are the same as used
in Bramsen (2008a) and Bramsen (2008b)
6To even out the load some are put for sale or set for expiration during the evening,
but almost all the auctions have close to one week of duration, and the selected auctions
all have a duration of 7 days +/- 6 hours.
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to Lauritz.com for the seller. Generally, the seller pays 10% of the reached
auction price (if above $500), and the buyer must pay additionally 20% plus
a fixed fee of $57.
During the auction bidders can either make the next available bid (the cur-
rent price plus some predetermined increment of e.g. $10) or use the max-bid
service (proxy bidder) and let the auction site bid for them. In economic
terms bidders can therefore bid as if it was a normal first price ascending
auction, or as if it was a sort of second price auction by putting in their
maximum bid. This bidding procedure is very close to the proxy bidding
system used on eBay, only the max-bids are also restricted to the incre-
ments. However, if a bid arrives within the last 3 minutes, the auction is
extended with 3 minutes. This is a so-called soft ending with always at least
3 minutes of time to react.
Once the auction is over the winner can pick up the item at the physical
auction house. Due to the Danish Sale of Goods Act there is, however, the
rather peculiar feature that buyers can regret and return the item within
two weeks. Although this feature could potentially affect the bidding, it
does not present a problem to this analysis8.
Although some bidders without doubt think a lot about how and when
to bid, theoretically there should be no effect of bidding behavior. The
objective valuation and the possibility to see the item physically minimizes
the information about value from other people’s bidding. The common value
argument for bidding late is therefore in theory absent. Furthermore, the
soft ending minimizes the possibility to surprise incremental bidders with a
late bid. Hence, this argument for bidding late as mentioned in the literature
is also missing9. Finally, as there are no auctions directly competing with
each other at the same time, bidders do not need to wait and see which one
to bid for. From a neoclassical point of view bidders should therefore simply
minimize their transaction costs and put in their maximum willingness to
pay as a max-bid at the point where they discover the auction.
7Since these are Danish auctions all prices are originally in DKK. The conversion rate
used throughout is 1 USD = 5 DKK (2008).
8If there is uncertainty about WTP it can potentially make it less costly to bid. How-
ever, bidders will still have incentive to bid what they believe is their WTP. It must
therefore be the same underlying mechanisms that affect bidding with or without this
option. Furthermore, there are transaction costs and only a very limited number does
actually use the option (in this data, 6.5%). In comparison to eBay, where a bidder can
ignore the purchase (perhaps with a black-listing as consequence) bidding on Lauritz.com
seems to be more committing.
9See e.g. Ockenfels and Roth (2006) for a theoretical and empirical analysis on this.
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3 Bidding strategies
Most literature on experience in internet auctions have so far focused on the
actual bidding behavior. Wilcox (2000), for instance, finds that experience
leads to fewer bids and more late bidding. Similar results have been found by
Ockenfels and Roth (2002) and Borle et al. (2006). This analysis therefore
start by simply comparing the timing and amount of bidding by different
groups of bidders characterized by their experience.
In furniture auctions on Lauritz.com you can find several kinds of bidders.
At present (2008) the number of new sign-ups is 8000 pr month, indicating a
high amount of newcomers and amateurs. On the other side of the spectrum
there are bidders who participate in several hundred furniture auctions per
year and win auctions by the dozen10. It would be quite exceptional for
private consumers to buy more than a handful expensive furniture during
only one year. Hence, I also expect that there are professional bidders with
a motive of re-sale.
Optimally, there would be data on the single bidder’s total participation
since sign-up. Moreover, it could be useful to know if, for instance, the
user is private or professional. However, the only available information is
the bidding for modern furniture per buyer id during 2005. I will therefore
use the number of auctions which the single bidder has participated in as a
proxy for classifying the bidder.
In Table 1 I have defined five groups of bidders depending on their level of
participation during 200511. The table also shows the number of bidders in
each group (Bidders) and the total combination of bidder and auction (N),
i.e. the unit of observation. Similarly, you can also find the total number of
bidders (Bidderssub) and the number of observations they represent (Nsub)
from the subset used in Section 4.
An alternative way of defining these groups could be to include the number
of wins. Due to transaction costs you could, for instance, expect professional
bidders to have at least a certain percentage of wins. Yet, using winning
as part of the definition would create an endogeneity problem. I suspect
that a high proportion of wins will at least partly be a result of the bidding
behavior. Thus, the simple definition in Table 1 will be used throughout the
paper.
10In this data up to 1554 auctions and 212 wins during 2005.
11Whereas all other measure are calculated on the selected subset with more than one
bidder, the participation is a measure of total participation of all modern furniture auctions
in 2005
6
Group name Participation Bidders N Bidderssub Nsub
Novice [0, 5] 18,024 28,863 3,022 3,403
Amateur [6, 20] 3,800 24,167 1,636 2,796
Experienced [21, 50] 739 14,356 486 1,611
Semi-Prof. [51, 200] 322 17,868 257 1,789
Professional [201,∞] 56 15,467 48 1,912
Total - 22,941 100,721 5,449 11,511
Table 1: Definition of groups
Perhaps the most important part of a bidding strategy is when to bid. Es-
pecially the time of entry has been discussed widely in the literature. Figure
1 shows the empirical distributions of the first bid during the week of the
auctions for the 5 groups. More specifically, the proportions of first bids for
each day is plotted in a histogram for each group, where the total area of
each histogram is 1.
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Figure 1: Timing of first bid
Generally, bidders enter either the first or last day perhaps due to two sub-
categories at the site: “New items” and “Last chance”. Still, there is a
significant development in the timing of entry as bidders get more experi-
enced. Beginners have a tendency to bid on the last day while this shifts
towards the first day for the “Professionals”. Thus, experience leads to
earlier entry.
The timing of bids has typically been coupled to late bids and sniping. With
this in mind, I have measured the bidding according to the three following
definitions;
Late bids If a bidder bids within the last hour, I measure this as a “Late
bid”.
Sniping bids If the bidder bids within the last 10 minutes, I phrase this
as a “Sniping bid”
Bidding wars If a bidder bids two times within the last 10 minutes, i.e.
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she bids and rebids as a response to another bidder’s bid, I interpret
this as willingness to engage in a “Bidding war”.
I do not have data for possible extensions due to the 3 minutes rule (soft
ending). The exact time of finish in the data is therefore including possible
extensions. As a consequence, some “late bids” may have been intended to
be sniping bids. This is the reasoning behind the rather wide limit of 10
minutes for “sniping bids”.
For each bidder I calculate the share of the auctions in the subset where
she is represented with such bids. In Appendix A there is three plots with
every bidder’s percentage. Naturally, there is quite a variation, especially if
the bidder only participated a few times. There is, however, a clear picture
if you consider the average for the 5 bidding groups. They are shown in
Figure 2. Novice bidders, for instance, use sniping bids in 15% on average
of the auctions they participate in, while Experienced use sniping in 7%
on average. Unambiguously, these averages indicate that as bidders get
more experienced they less often make late bids, sniping bids and engage in
bidding wars.
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Figure 2: Group averages for late bidding
Although this is a very clear picture it could, in principle, be due to the
group limits. To reject any doubt, two smoothing regressions are therefore
added to each of the plots in Appendix A – the difference being a different
level of smoothing. Basically, these regressions all confirm that late bidding
in any form is less frequent when bidders become more experienced12.
Another typical subject is the number of bids per auction. Figure 3 shows
12There is a shifts within the group of professionals, but this is due to the low number
of observations and should therefore not be of any concern.
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the distribution of actual bids per auction for the 5 groups 13. Again, there
is a clear effect of experience. As bidders learn, they use fewer bids per
auction and in more than 67% of the auctions which the “Professionals”
participate in, they only bid once. This downtrend is also confirmed by the
plot and smoothing regressions in Appendix A.
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Figure 3: Number of bids per auction
Generally, by looking at the data we can therefore observe a clear devel-
opment in the bidding behavior with experience. As further confirmation
Table shows the result of simple regressions with ln(Participation) as the
explanatory variable. Comparing with the standard deviations in brackets
it is evident that in all the cases the negative estimate for ln(Participation)
is three-star significant.
No. of bids Late bids Sniping Wars
Intercept 3.05 0.282 0.162 0.071
(0.02) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
ln(Participation) -0.25 -0.043 -0.027 -0.014
(0.02) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Table 2: Effect of experience - simple regressions
The overall conclusion must be that bidders do learn something. Yet, it
is still not totally obvious what it is they learn. Before addressing this
question, it could be useful to explore the winning ratio, i.e. the number of
auctions the bidder is winning as a fraction of the total number of auctions
she participates in.
Figure 4 shows the distribution of winning ratios for the five groups. Al-
though the mean is diminishing with participation, the picture is a bit more
ambiguous. To further illustrate, Figure 5 shows a plot of all the bidders
winning ratio compared to their participation level. Moreover, the predic-
tions of two different smoothing regressions are also shown – the dark grey
being more smoothing. Group limits are indicated with thin broken lines.
13Note: Above 8 bids per auction is accumulated in the last bar.
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A little caution must be exercised evaluating the winning ratio for Novice
bidders. These will naturally have a tendency either to win or not to win as
many of them only participate once or twice, but this division could also be
a result of underlying preferences. On one side, there might be bidders that
simply use the auction as entertainment. On the other side, there could be
bidders that find exactly what they have been looking for, and price will be
of less importance. However, this does not seem to be a major problem here
as the smoothing regressions are, in fact, smooth.
Overall, the conclusion must be that bidders who participates more is win-
ning less often. Yet, this is not necessarily the same as saying that experience
makes the bidder less successful. Indeed, I will argue that the opposite is
true. Perhaps it is exactly due to learning that bidders win less often. If the
main objective is to get a good deal it may not be optimal to win all the
auctions you participate in.
The literature on eBay argues that sniping is the optimal behavior ( see e.g.
the review of Bajari and Hortacsu (2004)). This auction is, as described
in Section 2, very different on key points and sniping is not necessarily the
optimal bidding strategy on Lauritz.com. The analysis in Bramsen (2008a)
does, in fact, suggest the opposite for this auction. The reason is that early
bids will scare of potential bidders, who otherwise would have been willing
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to run up the bid if they had entered.
In that case bidders do seem to adapt a more optimal bidding strategy.
Fewer bids and earlier entry indicate that bidders learn to use max-bids.
This will save transaction costs, but perhaps more importantly, it can scare
off bidders and depress the winning bid.
Some of the bidders in the group “Professionals” do seem to win more often.
and the smoothing regression does make an upward shift for the bidders with
the most experience in Figure 5. However, this nicely corresponds to the
argument that real professionals might have higher transactions costs for
bidding and must therefore win more often compared to amateur bidders,
who also bid for fun.
In sum, these data can basically support the underlying conclusions from
previous studies on eBay data. Experience will make bidders more com-
fortable with the proxy bidding procedure and make them bid fewer times.
Moreover, as argued, experience will also make the timing of bids more
optimal.
4 Pseudo-endowment
Auctions have traditionally been blamed for causing “auction fever”, and
internet auctions seem not to be the exception. For instance, there are
studies which show that bidders on eBay end up paying much more than
from other relevant alternatives because they “get caught by the game”
(Lee and Malmendier, 2006; Ariely and Simonsen, 2003). Although these
are extreme examples, they are part of the evidence suggesting that bidders
change their willingness to pay (WTP) during the auction (see also Bajari
and Hortacsu (2003) and Bramsen (2008a)). The bidding as such is therefore
just part of the test for rationality through market experience.
One explanation behind increasing bids is that bidders start to see the auc-
tion as a competition where winning is the aim (Lee and Malmendier, 2006;
Wolf et al., 2006). In such a case you would expect bidders to make more
late bidding where the “battle” to win is the most intense. If so, the devel-
opment in late bidding as observed in Section 3 does suggest that experience
diminishes “auction fever”.
Competition is not the only possible reason behind increasing bids. Bidders
might actually change their underlying WTP during the auction if they get
attached to the item. More specifically, as bidders start to expect to win they
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might be affected by a sort of endowment effect – even though they do not
has the actual ownership yet. Such a pseudo-endowment14 effect have been
found in a laboratory experiment by Ariely et al. (2004) and empirically by
Bramsen (2008b). The effect of experience on the pseudo-endowment effect
is therefore another test for the hypothesis that market experience will lead
to rationality.
The critical and problematic element in asking what changes WTP is that
I, in fact, have no way of knowing what a bidder’s actual WTP is. Yet, by
critically disregarding any bid that simply cannot be a credible representa-
tion of a bidder’s WTP, chances are that at least a significant proportion of
the remaining bids are representing WTP. This is the approach of Bramsen
(2008b) and will also be the approach here.
Following the argumentation in Bramsen (2008b) the exact selection criteria
of the bids in the 100,721 auction·bidder sample from section 3 are:
Only bids that are outbid There is no reason for a bidder to revise WTP
and rebid if her bid is not outbid.
First bids only Although all bids might represent WTP I chose to focus
only on the first bid and the probability to rebid a second time. One
observation is therefore again the combination auction·bidders.
Only reasonably high bids Only first bids above 60% of the actual final
price are considered.
Only max-bids In the auction bidders can chose to bid the next increment
(as a first price auction) or a higher max-bid (a proxy bid). Only bids
above the next increment are considered.
Only low second bids If the bid increases from the first bid to the second
bid is higher than 20%, the first bid is unlikely to be a representation
of WTP and is therefore disregarded.
Not too many bids Bidding more than 5 times in total in the auction in-
dicates that the first bid is unlikely to represent WTP and is therefore
disregarded.
Not fast rebidding Rebidding within minutes indicates that this is not
a pseudo-endowment effect but perhaps in stead auction fever. Only
bids that have not be increased within 4 hours are included.
14Although Ariely et al. (2004) call it quasi-endowment effect, Prelec (1990) was the
first to name it pseudo-endowment in another context.
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Naturally, the limit of each criteria is arbitrary, but all the limits have no
significant effect on the resulting endowment effect, in a sensitivity analy-
sis as reported in Appendix D. The exception is the last criteria as fast
rebidding can reverse the effect. However, fast rebidding could be a sign
of auction fever. As argued in Bramsen (2008b) high intensity rebidding is
in that case expected to dominate a slower underlying pseudo-endowment
effect. I therefore see this as a confirmation rather than a problem.
With this selection the remaining number of observations (first bids) is
11,511 (Nsub). The distribution between the five groups can be found in
Table 1. The selection of max-bids means that the average ratio of bidders
rebidding after the first bid decreases from 50.18% to 24.51%.
The idea is basically to ask if pseudo-ownership (in some form) affects the
probability for bidders to rebid a second time if their first bid is outbid.
The answer goes through a logit regression. More precisely, if yi is a binary
variable being 1 if bidder i rebids and 0 if bidder i does not rebid if outbid,
then yi can be represented by a binomial distribution where yi ∼ B(1, pi)
for i = 1, .., N . I assume that pi can be described using a logit model where
pseudo-ownership is an explanatory variable15.
As the main objective in Bramsen (2008b) is to establish the pseudo-endowment
effect, experienced bidders are disregarded based on the assumption that
experience could make the effect less clear. The idea with this section is
basically to follow the same approach, but for all bidders, and to focus ex-
plicitly on the effect of experience. The general specification of the logit
model here is therefore:
ln
(
pi
1− pi
)
= f(experiencei · pseudo-endowmenti) + g(controlsi) + ǫi
where ǫi is a random stochastic variable. I will use a simple linear spec-
ification of f() and g(). The controlling variables of g() can be found in
Appendix B.
In Bramsen (2008b) two measures of pseudo-endowment are found to have
effect on the probability to rebid when outbid. One measure is the amount
of time that a bidder has the leading bid before being outbid. This corre-
sponds nicely to the observation by Strahilevitz and Loewenstein (1998) who
observed that the endowment effect is enhanced with duration of ownership.
The other measure is “Depth” of ownership. Depth is defined as the amount
between the current auction price and the max-bid of the bidder. If for
15Actually, i represent the combination of bidder and auction in the first model, but
only the bidder in the second model as explained below.
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Figure 6: The “Area of pseudo-endowment”
instance the bidder puts in a max-bid of $1000 and the previous leading
bidder’s max is $400, the current price will increase to $420 ($400 plus
an increment) and the Depth will be $1000-$420 = $580. A bidder must
generally be more optimistic about the probability to win the lower the
current price and the higher the depth. Depth must therefore be a proxy of
the expectation to win.
These two measure can be combined in what can be characterized as an
“Area of pseudo-endowment”. An example of such an Area is shown in
Figure 6 where our bidder from before is outbid after periods with prices of
$420, $680 and $740. The main result of Bramsen (2008b) is that the loga-
rithm to this area is the best determination of the pseudo-endowment effect.
Thus, a larger area predicts a higher probability to rebid if outbid16. The
question I ask here is therefore if the “Area of pseudo-endowment” is equally
important for the probability to rebid as bidders get more experienced.
I use the 5 groups as described in Table 1 as specification of experience.
Thus, the logit regression is an estimation of group specific pseudo-endowment
effects: groupi · ln(Area). The full result can be found in Appendix C, but
Figure 7 shows the pseudo-endowment effects for the 5 groups with 95%
confidence bands.
16It is somewhat ambiguous when the area is zero. This could either be because the
bidder was outbid right away or because the current price equals the bidder’s max bid. If
the latter is the case the bidder will still feel some sort of ownership. In this case I have
added a dummy to absorb the pseudo-endowment effect.
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Figure 7: Estimated effects from logit regressions
The logit regression needs to be slightly more complicated than that of
Bramsen (2008b). First of all, as some bidders are represented with a large
number of bids the possible correlation between these bids must be taken into
account.“Cluster” is estimated using a robust variance estimator making the
standard deviations slightly larger than in a simple logit regression.
Another possible modification is that bidders should count equally in the re-
gression regardless of the number of auctions they participate in. “Weighted”
is therefore a logit model were the bids are down-weighted such that all bid-
ders only count as one in the subset. Effectively the data set therefore
consists of 5449 bidders in stead 11,511 first bids.
In my opinion the right result is intuitively somewhere in between the two
models, as you can also argue that more important bidders should have
more influence on the result. Either way, both models show that the pseudo-
endowment effect does not disappear with experience. In both models the
group effect of “Professionals”, that participated in more than 200 furniture
auctions in 2005, is highly significant.
As expected there is some tendency of the pseudo-endowment effect to di-
minish through experience, but especially in the Cluster model this tendency
is weak. It also seems that the effects are stronger if the bids are Weighted,
but as other parameters also change from one model to the other, these
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parameters cannot be directly compared.
Statistically, the relevant question is if the groups are necessary when de-
scribing the pseudo-endowment effect of a bidder. I test this hypothesis in
a Wald-test. For the Cluster model the result is a P-value of 0.1723 and for
the Weighted model the P-value is 0.00369. Thus, the Cluster model cannot
reject this hypothesis while the Weighted model can. In other words, one
model suggests that there is no statistically significant effect of experience,
while the other suggests that there is some.
To conclude, the observation from this part of the analysis is that bidders
may learn a little, but generally they will still be affected by the pseudo-
endowment effect regardless of their experience. From this perspective ex-
perience will therefore not lead to rationality.
5 Discussion and conclusions
The results in this paper are at face value ambiguous. By only looking at the
bidding it appears that bidders do learn to bid more optimal. They bid fewer
times, engage in fewer bidding wars and bid early in the auction perhaps
to scare off other bidders as suggested by Bramsen (2008a). However, even
experienced bidders are still affected by the pseudo-endowment effect. Yet,
these seemingly conflicting findings do correspond to other findings in the
literature.
There are a number of studies with evidence of learning by market expe-
rience. As mentioned in Section 3 there are several surveys on eBay data
showing that experience optimizes the bidding. Livingston (2008) also finds
that experienced bidders learn to take the reputation of sellers into account
when they decide to bid on eBay. On the endowment effect List (2003) finds
that experience in the trading of sports cards does, to some extent, eliminate
the endowment effects of these cards. Moreover, this learning effect appears
to transfer over to the trading of other items like mugs and candy bars (List,
2004).
Although bidders and traders do seem to learn, the evidence does not nec-
essarily suggest that they become rational. In laboratory experiments of
second-price auctions people learn to bid more consistently and like each
other, but they do not learn to use their dominant strategy (see e.g. Kagel
and Levin (1993), Garratt and Wooders (2004) and Noy and Rafaeli (2005)).
In stock markets traders value stocks higher once they own them and, al-
though this endowment effect is more pronounced for private traders, the
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effect does not disappear for institutional brokers. An even stronger obser-
vation is done by Haigh and List (2005) who find that professional stock
brokers exhibit more loss aversion than a control group of students. Thus,
it may not always be rationality that we learn in the market.
The underlying explanation may be found in the feedback as suggested by
Loomes et al. (2003). The classical argument is that market participants will
learn through experience. Yet, learning is not derived from experience per
se, but from the feedback you can get through experience. Some feedback
may push you towards rationality while other feedback may push you further
away. Although Loomes et al. (2003) focus on separating the two cases17
the main point here is that you can only learn what the feedback directly or
indirectly is teaching you. In light of this the conflicting evidence reported
here appears reasonable.
Of all feedback, negative feedback appears to be the most influential. In
Braga et al. (2006) it is actual losses in lotteries that reverse participants’
preferences for lotteries over sure outcomes. Even more relevant is the analy-
sis of newly registered eBay bidders by Wang and Hu (2007). They conclude
that above all it is the loosing experiences that develop these new bidders’
bidding behavior.
Learning by losing also seems to be the case for bidding on both eBay and
Lauritz.com. Beginners being outbid in the last second on eBay will learn to
use the dominating strategy of sniping. With the soft ending on Lauritz.com
the likely loss for a beginner is the intension of bidding late, but to forget.
The lesson here will be to save transaction costs and bid earlier with a max-
bid. Though, it can also be the case that feedback is limited to observing
the bidding of others. In that case learning is more a question of copying
behavior (herding).
When it comes to the pseudo-endowment effect there is, however, no feed-
back. You cannot learn by observing others, and the negative feedback from
paying “to much” is hidden. Once the bidders actually get to own the items
they will feel the endowment effect even stronger and not be able to recog-
nize their inflated WTP18. Even professional bidders may not realize their
own pseudo-endowment effect as the negative feedback is likely to be absent
or delayed. This is the case if the item is resold with a profit after all or if
the resale happens several month later. Yet, this reasoning is speculation
17When participants are corrected towards underlying rational preferences Loomes et al.
(2003) label this as the market discipline hypothesis. The contrary is when markets are
shaping behavior decoupled from rationality. This is labeled as the shaping hypothesis.
18Or at least they will have a hard time recognizing their mistake due to cognitive
dissonance.
17
and the coupling between the auction and resale market is an obvious object
for further investigation.
Generally, the observations on experience and auction behavior is likely to be
a consequence of the feedback. When bidders learn to change their bidding
strategy they are likely to respond to negative feedback. And when bidders
have more difficulties learning their pseudo-endowment effect it is due to the
lack in feedback.
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APPENDIX
A Robustness of bidding behavior
In Section 3 the bidding behavior of five groups of bidders were analyzed.
However, group averages could potentially conceal substantial variation within
the groups. In order to check for such effects the data for each bidder is
plotted in Figure 8 to 11 with the level of participation on the x-axis with a
logistic scale. Group limits are indicated with thin broken lines. Moreover,
I have also added two smoothing-regressions such that the local average can
be observed. The difference in the two smoothing regressions is the degree
of smoothing where the dark grey line is more smoothing than the brighter
grey. In all four figures there do not seem to be major movements within
the groups. “Professional” (above 200) does seem to have some variation,
but this is mainly due to the small amount of bidders in this group.
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Figure 8: Auctions with late bids (last hour)
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Figure 9: Auctions with sniping bids (a bid within last 10 min)
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Figure 10: Auction with two bids within last 10 min (bidding war)
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Figure 11: Average number of bids (bidder)
B Controlling variables
The controlling variables are basically the same as in Bramsen (2008b).
Although the selection of first bids is supposed to be strict, other factor could
still affect the stated WTP (bid) resulting in a variation in the rebidding.
The factors I use in the logit regressions are:
Group More experienced bidders may in general be less likely to rebid. To
separate this effect from the pseudo-endowment effect, I use groups as
controls.
Experience Does basically the same as the individual group effect, but the
combination opens up for flexibility.
Time of entry If a bidder is looking for some special item she is more
likely to find it earlier in the auction period than bidders who are just
randomly searching. Hence, early bidders might have higher WTP.
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This is in itself not a problem if the bidder really bids her maximum
WTP. However, as the price is likely to be lower early in the auction
this can act as an anchor depressing the first bid. The probability to
rebid could for this reason be higher.
Valuation As mentioned in Section 2 Lauritz.com lists an estimate of the
final price to guide both the sellers and the buyers. For expensive
items (e.g. with a valuation of $4000) bidders might hesitate to put
in their true WTP. As a consequence they might be more inclined to
increase their bid later in the auction.
Price at entry A relative low price at entry compared to the actual value
(the final price) might depress the bidders entry bid – just as a high
valuation or early bids could do.
Basically, these last three controls are therefore taking an “anchoring effect”
into account.
C Result of logit regressions
The specific results of the logit regressions as reported in Section 4 can be
found in Table 3. I will briefly comment on the result for the controlling
parameters.
The independent group effect is decreasing as expected. Although the effect,
to a small extend, is counteracted with the “experience” control, the overall
conclusion is that more experienced bidders rebid less often in general.
The anchoring effects of “Time of entry” and “Price at entry” are also as
expected. Later entry and a higher price at entry will decrease the proba-
bility of rebidding. The effect of “Valuation” is the opposite as expected for
anchoring, but the effect is not significant.
The “Dummy” is part of the pseudo-endowment effect, and the result is ba-
sically that even when Depth=0, but still with a leading bid, it will create a
pseudo-endowment effect. Not to complicate the analysis and the interpre-
tation needlessly, I did not combine this caveat of the pseudo-endowment
effect with experience.
Further comments on the models and the results can be found in Section 4
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Parameters: Cluster Weighted
Intercept (Amateur) -1.06*** -1.52***
(0.15) (0.14)
Independent group effects:
Novice 0.16* 0.05
(0.06) (0.07)
Experienced -0.15 -0.12
(0.09) (0.10)
Semi-Prof -0.18 -0.23*
(0.11) (0.11)
Professional -0.25 -0.15
(0.28) (0.27)
Controls:
Experience (1/100) 0.025 0.039
(0.046) (0.048)
Time of Entry -0.053** 0.007
(0.017) (0.017)
Valuation (1/1000) -0.017 0.013
(0.053) (0.061)
Price/Valuation -0.58*** -0.39**
(0.12) (0.13)
Pseudo-endowment effects:
Dummy 1.31*** 2.09***
(0.29) (0.29)
Novice*ln(Pseudo-endowment) 0.100*** 0.147***
(0.017) (0.017)
Amateur*ln(Pseudo-endowment) 0.093*** 0.139***
(0.017) (0.017)
Experienced*ln(Pseudo-endowment) 0.085*** 0.140***
(0.019) (0.020)
Semi-Prof*ln(Pseudo-endowment) 0.086*** 0.116***
(0.018) (0.020)
Professional*ln(Pseudo-endowment) 0.076*** 0.098***
(0.017) (0.020)
Table 3: Development in the pseudo-endowment effect - Logit regressions
D Sensitivity analysis
The criteria to select the max-bids are based on my best estimates of the
bidding behavior, but they are of course arbitrary. To test for dependence
on the exact limits, Table 4 shows a sensitivity analysis where I vary one
restriction at the time. For every variation I have stated the group specific
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pseudo-endowment effect for the “Cluster” model and the number of obser-
vations in the sample (Nsub). Note that for most criteria the actual limit (in
bold) is not the one maximizing the pseudo-endowment effect. Furthermore,
the resulting pseudo-endowment effects in and between groups are quite ro-
bust. This is also true for the significant levels where all (except the two
last limits for time) are three star significant.
As mentioned, the exception is the criteria of time between first and second
bid. If I allow for a shorter period between bid and rebid, the sample will
at a point be dominated by another behavior, perhaps auction fever, and
the sign is changed. The same pattern was found in Bramsen (2008b) and I
think it basically confirms that this is not auction fever, but something else.
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Novice Amateur Experienced Semi-Prof Professional Nsub
≥ % of final price
80% 0.162 0.184 0.154 0.153 0.151 5492
70% 0.107 0.113 0.098 0.095 0.085 8385
60% 0.100 0.093 0.085 0.086 0.076 11511
50% 0.090 0.084 0.081 0.083 0.071 14658
40% 0.095 0.090 0.086 0.081 0.071 18392
Only max-bids:
Yes 0.100 0.093 0.085 0.086 0.076 11511
No restriction 0.080 0.074 0.073 0.071 0.069 17272
Bid increase:
≤20% 0.100 0.093 0.085 0.086 0.076 11511
No restriction 0.123 0.118 0.110 0.110 0.102 12093
Number of rebids:
≤ 6 rebids 0.103 0.094 0.090 0.091 0.080 11574
≤ 4 rebids 0.100 0.093 0.085 0.086 0.076 11511
≤ 3 rebids 0.096 0.088 0.079 0.079 0.072 11409
≤ 2 rebids 0.098 0.096 0.084 0.082 0.081 11115
Rebid within:
≥ 8 hours 0.114 0.106 0.094 0.099 0.087 11305
≥ 4 hours 0.100 0.093 0.085 0.086 0.076 11511
≥ 1 hour 0.045 0.048 0.045 0.044 0.038 12019
≥ 30 minutes 0.015 0.019 0.017 0.017 0.009 12227
No restriction -0.071 -0.068 -0.071 -0.078 -0.066 15695
Table 4: Sensitivity analysis on Cluster model
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